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Ferraro: Criminal Procedure

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

UNITED STATES v. DE GROSS: THE NINTH
CIRCUIT EXPANDS RESTRICTIONS ON A
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
EXERCISE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
I. INTRODUCTION

In United States v. De Gross,I the Ninth Circuit held that a
criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge 2 based
solely on the gender of the venire person violates the potential
juror's rights to equal protection under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment. 3
The Ninth Circuit's decisipn represents a step forward in
restraining purposeful discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. In De Gross, the court expanded upon the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Batson
v. Kentucky:' The court recognized that the Fifth Amendment's
1. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (per Wallace, C.J.; the
other panel members were Hug, J., Tang, J., Schroeder, J., Alarcon, J., Nelson, J., Reinhardt, J., Beezer, J., Wiggins, J., Rymer, J., and Fernandez, J.).
2. A peremptory challenge is the method whereby a litigant can exercise his or her
right to challenge a juror without assigning, or being required to assign, a reason for the
challenge. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V, provides in part: "No person shall ... be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... "
The fifth amendment does not contain the "explicit safeguard" of an equal protection clause, as does the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, equal protection principles
have been consistently derived from the fifth amendment's due process clause. Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
4. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). See infra notes 49-63 and accompanying text discussing the
Batson decision holding that the Constitution forbids peremptory challenges based
solely on the race of the venire person and setting forth a new evidentiary standard that a

109,

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 12

110

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:109

equal protection principles regulate only state action and not
private conduct. 6 Reasoning that a criminal defendants becomes
a state actors6 by invoking the authority of the state when exercising governmental peremptory challenges,7 the court concluded
that the Fifth Amendment prohibits a criminal defendant's exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges. 8
The Ninth Circuit further held that the government has
standing9 to object to a discriminatory peremptory challenge,
based on its own injury l0 as well as the injury to the potential
juror. l l The Ninth Circuit also held that equal protection principles effectively prohibit discriminatory peremptory challenges
based solely on the gender of the venireperson. 12

II. FACTS
Juana Espericueta De Gross was convicted of aiding and
abetting the transportation of an alien within the United
States. IS During voir dire,14 De Gross' exercised her first seven
criminal defendant must meet in order to establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination against the prosecution's peremptory challenge.
5. "In determining whether an action complained of constitutes 'state action' within
purview of [Fifth) Amendment, the court must examine whether a sufficiently close
nexus exists between state and challenged action so that the action may fairly be treated
as that of the state itself." Denver Welfare Rights Org. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 547 P.2d
239, 243 (Colo. 1976).
6. See infra notes 90-108 and accompanying text for a discussion of criminal
defendants as state actors.
7. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440-42.
8. Id. at 1440.
9. Id. at 1436-37.
10. Id. at 1436. The government has a legitimate interest in having its criminal prosecutions tried before a jury most likely to produce a fair result. Singer v. United States,
380 U.S. 24, 36 (1965). Hence, it follows that the government is injured when the defendant endeavors to secure a partisan jury through discriminatory peremptory strikes. See
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502 (1972) (8 defendant is denied due process by circumstances that create the likelihood or the appearance of bias).
11. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436. Generally, a party must assert his or her own legal
rights as another has no standing to raise those interests for the aggrieved. Powers v.
Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991). However, a third party may promote the rights of
another if the third party's ability to protect his or her own interest will be hindered
otherwise. Id. at 1371-72.
12. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438. In reaching this conclusion, the De Gross court drew
from recent United States Supreme Court decisions holding that the Constitution forbids discriminatory peremptory challenges based solely on the race of the potential juror.
See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
13. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1435 (9th Cir. 1992). 8 U.S.C. § 1324

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol23/iss1/12

2

Ferraro: Criminal Procedure

1993]

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

111

peremptory challenges to strike male venirepersons. 16 When De
Gross attempted to exercise her eighth peremptory challenge to
strike Wendell Tiffany, yet another male venireperson, the government objected, contending that De Gross' pattern of striking
males established her discriminatory intent. IS The government
argued that such discriminatory challenges violate the male
venireperson's constitutional rights to equal protection of the
laws. 17
The district court held that the government established a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination, and required that
De Gross furnish a non-discriminatory justification for the challenge. 18 When De Gross offered no explanation for the challenge,
the court disallowed her peremptory challenge and empaneled
Tiffany.19
After De Gross' challenge of Tiffany, the government peremptorily challenged Herminia Tellez, the only Hispanic on the
venire. 20 In turn, De Gross objected to this peremptory challenge
made by the prosecution, claiming the challenge violated Tellez's constitutional rights under the Fifth Amendment. 21 The
district court likewise required the government to justify its
challenge because De Gross had established a prima facie case of
discrimination. 22 Government counsel explained that the purpose of its peremptory challenge was to attempt to achieve "a
more representative community of men and women on the
jury."23 The district court accepted the government's grounds
(1983), prohibits a United States citizen from facilitating the transportation of an alien
within the United States.
14. "Voir dire" is the designated phrase for the preliminary examination the court
and attorneys make of prospective jurors to determine their competence and qualifications to serve as jurors. Peremptory challenges or challenges for cause may result from
such examination. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990).
15. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1435-36. "Venireperson" is the term designating potential
jurors in the jury pool, or the "venire." .
.
16. [d. See infra notes 109-18 and accompanying text for discussion of discriminatory intent.
17. [d. at 1436.
18. [d. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text setting forth the elements of
the prima facie case of intentional discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky.
19.
20.
21.
22.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.
23. [d. At that point, ten women and two men had been empaneled on the jury, and
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for the challenge as non-discriminatory and excused Tellez.24
III. BACKGROUND
A.

THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE SYSTEM

The Constitution does not guarantee the right to peremptory challenges. 211 However, state and federal statutes provide for
peremptory challenges in the majority of jurisdictions,26 and
courts have long recognized the peremptory challenge as an integral part of the jury selection procedure. 27 The United States
Supreme Court has stressed the vital role of peremptory challenges in the trial by jury process, stating that the challenge is
"one of the most important of the rights secured to the accused. "28 The purpose of the peremptory challenge is "not only
to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides, but to assure
the parties that the jurors before whom they try the case will
decide on the basis of the evidence placed before them, and not
otherwise. "29
the remainder of the venire consisted of six women and one man. Id. n.3.
24.Id.
25. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (citing Stilson v. United States, 250
U.S. 583, 586 (1919».
26. In the federal system, each litigant is entitled to 20 peremptories in capital
cases. In a felony trial the defendant may exercise 10 peremptory challenges and the
prosecution is entitled to 6, while in a misdemeanor case each litigant is entitled to three
peremptory challenges. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). In the majority of state jurisdictions, similar. provisions are found with the prosecution and defense having the sarne number of
peremptory challenges. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
22(d) (2nd ed. 1992).
27. See Paul H. Schwartz, Note, Equal Protection in Jury Selection? The Implementation of Batson v. Kentucky in North Carolina, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1533 (1991) (providing a detailed account of the history of the peremptory challenge); see generally
Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 218-21 (1965); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376
(1892) (discussing the history of the peremptory challenge in civil voir dire proceedings).
28. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting Pointer v. United States,
151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894».
29. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. Certain commentators have suggested that a fundamental basis for the existence of the peremptory challenge is that it is "a means of satisfying
litigants that their case is being determined by an impartial group of laypeople." Comment, The Right of Peremptory Challenge, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762 (1957).
The peremptory challenge serves important functions. It exemplifies the notion that
a jury is the proper mode for deciding matters because the litigants choose the jurors,
thus guarding against faction. Additionally, it serves "as a shield for the exercise of the
challenge for cause," because during voir dire questioning, the lawyer may have so alienated the venireperson that it becomes necessary to strike him, although pursuant to the
challenge for cause the lawyer has not established any basis for removal. Barbara Allen
Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 552-55
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Historically, litigants could exercise the peremptory challenge without justification. This is unlike the challenge for
cause 30 which requires that the party seeking elimination satisfy
an objective disqualification standard. 31 Because the trial court
must, by definition, scrutinize a litigant's grounds and motives
for the exercise of a challenge for cause, there is little risk that
the challenge will be allowed if exercised for improper reasons
such as race or gender discrimination. There are, however, no
such inherent safeguards against the misuse of the peremptory
challenge. 32 Therefore, courts have imposed limits on the use of
the peremptory challenge so that the constitutional rights of all
parties can be protected. 33
B.

CASES CHALLENGING THE EXERCISE OF RACIALLy-BASED
DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AS VIOLATIVE OF
EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

As early as 1879, the United States Supreme Court held
that prohibiting blacks from serving on juries was a violation of
the Equal Protection Clause. 34 However, it was not until 1965, in
(1975).
30. The challenge for cause is a request from a litigant to the court that a certain
prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes
or reasons. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988).
31. Failure to meet the statutory qualifications for jury duty, evidence of bias, and
relationship to one of the litigants are grounds for challenging a potential juror for cause.
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 22.3(c) (2nd ed. 1992).
Additionally, if the prospective juror is found to have a state of mind that will prevent
her from acting with impartiality, this constitutes actual bias, requiring the challenge for
cause be granted. [d.
This is not to suggest that any isolated statement by a venire person necessitates
granting the challenge. In Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032-33 (1984), the Court held
that the determination is essentially one of credibility, and therefore of demeanor. The
trial judge has discretion to believe or dismiss those statements, depending on the surrounding circumstances, such as leading questions.
32. See Joseph F. Lawless, Jr., Prosecutorial Misconduct 409 (1985), claiming that
"the exercise of a peremptory challenge is virtually uncontrolled and completely discretionary by both parties. These challenges may be abused by those ... who would seek to
exercise them to obtain conviction-prone or racially unbalanced juries .... "
33. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1892).
The peremptory challenge has been the subject of much criticism, and there are
those who advocate eliminating the whole peremptory challenge system. See Jonathan B.
Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in the Right Direction (Racial Discrimination and Peremptory Challenges Under the Heavier Confines of Equal Protection),
72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026 (1987).
34. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). In Strauder, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the fourteenth amendment, ratified eleven years earlier,
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Swain v. Alabama,3G that the Court addressed the question of
whether the discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges to
exclude minoriti~s from juries violated equal protection
principles. 36 .

In Swain, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
that discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge could violate a venireperson's equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. 37 There, Robert Swain,
a black man, was convicted of rape and sentenced to death. 3s
Swain sought to strike the trial jury which convicted him, alleging the prosecution had intentionally discriminated against him
on the basis of race by peremptorily striking all black venirepersons at his trial. 39 The Court rejected Swain's argument, holding
that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges were not subject to
scrutiny on constitutional grounds!O The Court presumed that
the state's challenges were intended only to obtain a fair and
impartial jury,41 explaining that any other presumption would
"establish a rule wholly at odds with the peremptory challenge
system as we know it. "42
The Court recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment
claim takes on added significance whenever members of a racial
group are systematically excluded from jury service. 43 However,
was adopted to "assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that
under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of the
general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the states." [d.
at 306. Thus, the Court held that the state statute prohibiting blacks from serving on
juries was violative of the fourteenth amendment. [d. at 308.
35. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
36. [d. at 204.
37. [d.
38. [d. at 203.
39. [d. at 203-05.
40. [d. at 222.
41. [d. The Court announced that it was permissible to insulate from inquiry the
peremptory strikes of black venirepersons on the "assumption that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant
involved, and the particular crime charged." [d. at 223.
42. [d. at 222.
43. [d. at 223. The United States Supreme Court declared that in circumstances
where the prosecutor was regularly removing qualified black jurors with peremptory
challenges, "giving even the widest leeway to the operation of irrational but trial-related
suspicions and antagonisms, it would appear that the purpose of the peremptory challenge [is) being perverted. If the state has not seen fit to leave a single Negro on any jury
in a criminal case, the presumption protecting the prosecutor may well be overcome." [d.
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in order to rebut the presumption and establish a prima facie
case against the prosecution, the defendant was required to
demonstrate a systematic pattern of purposeful discriminatory
peremptory strikes. 44 The defendant would be compelled to
demonstrate that this methodical exclusion had deprived black
persons of the right to serve, not only at his own trial, but on
juries in all cases. 45 Although Swain contended that the state
had systematically and consistently excluded blacks from juries
in previous cases,46 the Court found that Swain had not overcome the imposing evidentiary standard}7

Swain was the first United States Supreme Court decision
to restrict the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges. Nevertheless, its impact on trial procedures was limited because few
defendants were able to overcome the presumption of fairness as
announced by the Court.'8 Not until the 1986 decision of Batson
v. Kentuck y 49 did the United States Supreme Court relax the
evidentiary standard necessary for a criminal defendant to establish a prima facie case of discrimination against the prosecution's peremptory challenges.
In that case, Batson, a black man, was indicted and convicted on charges of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. 50 The
prosecution exercised its peremptory challenges to strike the
only four black venirepersons from the jury pool, and selected a
at 223-24.
44. [d. at 224.
45. [d.
46. [d. at 223. Petitioner's argument was not only that all black venirepersons were

peremptorily stricken from his jury, but that "there hard] never been a Negro on a petit
jury in either a civil or criminal case in Talladega County .... " [d. at 222-23.
47. [d. at 224. The Court acknowledged that "there [had] not been a Negro on a
jury in Talladega County since about 1950." [d. at 226. However, Swain was unable to
sustain his burden of proving that the absence of black jurors in Talladega County was
due entirely to discriminatory peremptory strikes exercised by the prosecution.
48. Among those courts that employed the Swain standard to analyze the potential
misuse of the peremptory challenge, it appears that defendants were seldom able to overcome the overwhelming burden of proof required to effectively contest the exclusion of
venirepersons. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 104 (Marshall, J., concurring). An example where the Swain standard was satisfied is State v. Washington, 375 S.2d 1162 (La.
1979), where a black defendant was convicted by a jury in which all but one black
venireperson was peremptorily stricken. The court sustained the defendant's claim of
discrimination because the prosecutor conceded that he considered blacks, as a group,
too unintelligent to sit on the jury. [d. at 1164.
49. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
50. [d. at 82.
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jury composed exclusively of white persons. III Counsel for the defendant moved to discharge the jury, asserting that the prosecutor's removal of black venirepersons violated the defendant's
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to equal protection of
the laws. 1I2 On appeal, the Kentucky Supreme Court refused to
uphold Batson's objection since he failed to establish a consistent pattern of intentional discrimination by the prosecution, as
was then required under Swain v. Alabama. lls
The United States Supreme Court held that proof of the
prosecution's pattern of intentional discrimination, demonstrated by repeatedly striking blacks from jury venires, was unnecessary to establish a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. 1I4 The Court noted that this interpretation of Swain
placed a'staggering burden of proof on criminal defendants/III resulting in prosecutorial use of peremptory challenges in ways
that were "largely immune from constitutional scrutiny."lIs
The Batson Court announced a new standard of evidentiary
proof necessary for defendants to meet when alleging purposeful
. discrimination by the prosecution in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. Batson allowed a criminal defendant to establish a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based "solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory
challenges at [that particular] defendant's trial."117 The Court
held that all relevant circumstances would be considered in determining whether the defendant has made the requisite showing of discrimination. liS For instance, the prosecutor's questions
51. ld.
52. ld. Defense counsel also objected to the prosecution's removal of black
venirepersons on the ground that defendant's sixth amendment right to a jury drawn
from a cross-section of the community was being violated. The judge, reasoning that the
cross-section requirement only applied to selection of the venire, and not to the jury
itself, denied defendant's motion, stating that the parties were entitled to use their challenges to "strike anybody they want to."
53. ld. at 83.
54. ld. at 92.
55.ld.
56. ld. at 92-93.
57. ld. at 96. In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination,
the defendant must prove that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the
prosecution has peremptorily stricken members of the defendant's race from the venire,
and that the encompassing facts and circumstances suggest that the prosecution excluded the venirepersons on account of their race. ;
58.ld.
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and statements to black venirepersons, and the accompanying
peremptory challenges might suggest purposeful discrimination. 1I9
Once the defendant establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the state to justify its challenge of minority
venirepersons with a racially neutral reason for seeking to remove the juror. 60 However, the prosecution may not offer as explanation its assumption that the challenged venireperson would
be biased due to a shared ethnicity or race with the defendant. 61
Additionally, the Batson Court held the Equal Protection
Clause62 forbids exclusion of minority jurors on the assumption
that the minority members, as a group, are unfit to serve as
jurors. 6S

C.

QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

In Batson v. Kentuck y 64 and Swain v. Alabama,611 the
United States Supreme Court limited the prosecution's use of
59. [d. at 97. The Court explained that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir
dire procedures, would be best able to discern if a prima facie case of discrimination had
been established.
60. [d. The Court emphasized that while the requirement of a justification for a
challenge diminishes its historic peremptory character, the prosecution's explanation
need not rise to the level demanded for a challenge for cause. See supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the challenge for cause.
6!. [d.
62. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), involved a state defendant and therefore the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment is applicable. United
States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992), involved a federal defendant, thus the
equal protection principles of the fifth amendment apply.
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits any state
from taking action which would "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498 (1954). The Constitution
contains no textual authority for prohibiting the federal government from denying indi. viduals equal protection. However, it has been held that the due process clause of the
fifth amendment imposes comparable restrictions on the actions of the national government. [d. at 499.
63. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The United States Supreme Court in Batson purposely
limited its holding to discriminatory peremptory challenges on the basis of race. However, Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, suggested that the Court's decision would open
the floodgates for objections to peremptory challenges "on the basis of not only race, but
also sex, age, religious or political affiliation, mental capacity, number of children, living
arrangements, and employment in a particular industry or profession." [d. at 124 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
65. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
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discriminatory peremptory challenges. However, the Court had
not yet expressed an opinion on whether equal protection principles similarly limit a criminal defendant's exercise of peremp-·
tory challenges. 66 Furthermore, the Court had not explored the
issue of whether the Constitution prohibits discriminatory peremptory strikes on the basis of gender.
In United States v. De Gross,67 the Ninth Circuit addressed
both of these issues, further extending the constitutional constraints on the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges.
IV. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In United States v. De Gross,68 the Ninth Circuit reversed
De Gross' conviction of aiding and abetting the transportation of
an alien within the United States due to the prosecution's use of
a discriminatory peremptory challenge. The court held that the
Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles prohibit a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge based on the gender of the
venire person. 69
66. The Batson majority purposely declined to express its views on whether the
Constitution limits defendant's peremptory challenges. 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. However,
Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, stated that since prosecutors are limited in their
challenges, it is irrational to hold that defendants are not. [d. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Burger further stated that "every jurisdiction which has spoken to the matter,
and prohibited prosecution case-specific peremptory challenges on the basis of cognizable group affiliation, has held that the defense must likewise be so prohibited." [d. at 89
n.6 (quoting United States v. Leslie, 783 F.2d 541, 565 (5th Cir. 1986».
At the time the De Gross opinion was written, no United States Supreme Court case
had confronted the issue of equal protection restraints on criminal defendants' peremptory challenges. However, the Court's recent decision in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct.
2348 (1992), does address this issue, and holds that a criminal defendant is limited by
the Constitution. McCollum was decided after De Gross, and is thus not discussed in the
background section of this article. See infra notes 139-49 for a discussion of McCollum
and its applicability to the instant case.
67. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
68. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433, 1443 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. [d. at 1438. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1988) et seq., provides that a litigant is entitled to
a trial by jury in which the jury selection process is free from discrimination or bias. "A
defendant may establish a prima facie case of improper ... jury selection under the
constitutional standard by establishing absolute exclusion or systematic underrepresentation of a cognizable, distinct class." United States v. Gruberg, 493 F. Supp.
234, 245 (S.D. N.Y. 1979).
The major problem raised by defendant's assertion that the jury selection process
has been tainted by discrimination lies in defining "cognizable" groups. United States v.
Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), set forth the standard for determining
whether a group is cognizable. The defendant must show that the group is defined and
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The Ninth Circuit confronted three issues raised in De
Gross: first, whether the government had standing to object to
the defendant's peremptory challenge; second, whether equal
protection principles forbid gender-based discrimination in a
criminal defendant's peremptory challenge; and third, if equal
protection principles do prohibit such challenges, whether De
Gross exercised her peremptory challenge with discriminatory
intent. 7o
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles
forbid a party from peremptorily striking venirepersons on the
basis of gender is a question of law that the Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo. 71
B.

THE

GOVERNMENT'S STANDING TO

OBJECT TO DE

GROSS'

CHALLENGE

The Ninth Circuit rejected De Gross' argument that the
government lacked the requisite standing to object to her peremptory challenge. 72 The government maintained that it had
standing based on its own injury, as well as the injury to the
challenged juror. 78 The court announced that "racial discrimination in the jury selection process casts doubt on the integrity of
the judicial process and the fairness of the criminal proceeding."," Therefore, when a criminal defe~dant endeavors to se-_
limited by some factor, that a common thread or basic similarity in attitudes or ideas or
experience runs through the group, and that there is a community of interest among
members such that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury selection process. [d. at 143-44.
70. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436.
71. [d. See also United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1201 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984).
72. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436.
73. [d. For further discussion, see supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
74. [d. at 1437 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1371 (1991)). The court also
noted that discriminatory practices in jury selection create the appearance of prejudice
in the decision of individual cases, while increasing the danger of actual bias as well. De
Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436 (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972)). Additionally,
the court explained that excluding cognizable groups from jury service effectively restricts community participation in the administration of the criminal justice system;
"participation which is critical to public confidence in the fairness" of that system. Id.
(citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975)).
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cure a partisan jury through the exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges, the government suffers injury as a result of
the perceived and actual deterioration of the criminal justice
system.
The Ninth Circuit further held that the government has
standing to object to the defendant's discriminatory peremptory
challenge by asserting the excluded venireperson's equal protection rights. 711 A venireperson who has been excluded by a discriminatory peremptory challenge may face several obstacles to
asserting his or her own constitutional rights. 78 Unless the potential juror is aware of the challenging party's pattern of peremptorily striking members of a cognizable group, the
venireperson may not realize that he or she is the victim of discrimination. 77 Additionally, it is unlikely the excluded venireperson will bring a constitutional challenge on his or her own behalf
due to the prohibitive cost of litigation and the small financial
stakes. 78 Thus, the Ninth Circuit concluded the government has
standing to object to the peremptory challenge exercised by De
Gross.
C.

GENDER-BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES

The Ninth Circuit expanded on the Supreme Court's rulings
in Batson v. Kentuck y 79 and Swain v. Alabama 80 by stating that
equal protection principles prohibit not only racially-based discriminatory peremptory challenges,81 but gender-based challenges as well. 82 Although the Constitution will tolerate genderbased discrimination when an important governmental objective
IS being served,83 the peremptory challenge cannot be based
75. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1437. See supra note 11 for discussion of situations in
which the rights of a party may be raised by another.
76. [d.
77. [d.
78. [d.

79. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
80. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
81. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93.
82. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1437-38.
83. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender-based classifications
must be substantially related to the achievement of important governmental objectives
to withstand constitutional scrutiny); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (administrative
ease and convenience are not sufficiently important objectives to sustain use of an overt
gender criterion in the appointment of administrators of intestate decedents' estates).
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solely on the gender of the potential juror.M
The Batson Court held that striking a potential juror on the
basis of his or her race harms the excluded venireperson, undermines public confidence in the judicial system, and stimulates
community prejudice. 86 Deciding that these symptoms are just
as likely to occur as a result of gender-based discrimination, the
Ninth Circuit held that equal protection principles prohibit gender-based discriminatory peremptory challenges. 86

. 84. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439.
85. Batson, 476 U.S. at 87. The Batson Court announced that "[p)urposeful racial
discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection
because it denies him the protection that a trial by jury is intended to secure." [d. at 86.
See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), stating that the purpose of
the jury is to be composed of the peers or equals of the accused so as to afford him a
tribunal free of the prejudices that often exist against certain classes in the community.
A jury of peers operates to preserve the defendant's enjoyment of the full protection of
the laws.
86. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1438. This conclusion is not unanimously supported by all
the circuit courts of appeals. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Hamilton, 850 F.2d
1038, 1042 (4th Cir. 1988), held that the government could offer as a neutral justification
for its peremptory challenge a gender-based explanation. The Hamilton court stated that
while it did not applaud the striking of jurors for any reason relating to group classification, there was no authority to support an extension of Batson's equal protection principles to situations other than racial discrimination. [d. at 1042.
Compare Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975), where the United States
Supreme Court held that the systematic exclusion of women from jury venires violated
the potential juror's rights under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In that case, the Court found a Louisiana jury selection procedure to be unconstitutional because a woman could not be selected for jury service unless she had previously
filed an application requesting consideration for jury service. [d. at 523. The net effect
of this system was that disproportionately few women, as compared with the number
available in the community, were ever called for jury service. [d. at 525. This case is
distinguishable from Hamilton because in Hamilton there had been no claim that
women were systematically excluded from jury service. Hamilton, 850 F.2d at 1042.
For a thoughtful examination of gender-based peremptory challenges, see S. Alexandria Joe, Reconstruction of the Peremptory Challenge System: A Look at Gender-Based
Peremptory Challenges, 22 PAC. L. J. 1305, 1327-28 (1991), which asserts that racial and
gender classifications are analogous in three respects: first, both groups have historically
suffered discriminatory treatment due to membership in an identifiable group; second,
race and gender are both immutable characteristics, which cannot be changed; and third,
minority members as well as females have traditionally been politically powerless. Based
on these grounds, courts have conventionally treated race and gender classifications with
special care. [d. at 1327. See also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432 (1985) (holding that the requirements of a quasi-suspect class are historical discrimination, immutable traits, and political powerlessness).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993

13

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 12

122

1.

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The Government's

Per~mptory

[Vol. 23:109

Challenge

A prosecutor's gender·based discriminatory peremptory
challenge violates the Fifth Amendment's equal protection prin·
ciples. 87 As is the case with racially· based challenges, sexually
discriminatory peremptory challenges are premised on the stere·
otypical notion that a particular group of people are unfit to
serve as jurors. 88 While a venireperson may be successfully chal·
lenged due to the prosecution's perception that the particular
juror is unable to serve on the jury, gender·based challenges imply that the group, as opposed to the individual, is unqualified.
The Fifth Amendment forbids this type of group discrimination. 89

2.

The Defendant's Peremptory Challenge: The Question of
State Action

While Batson v. Kentucky held that the prosecution's exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges deprives a defend·
ant of equal protection of the laws,90 the decision did not address whether a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge is
similarly limited by the Constitution. In De Gross, the Ninth
Circuit addressed this question, and answered it in the affirmative, drawing from and expanding upon recent United States Supreme Court decisions.
The Ninth Circuit noted that equal protection principles
are directed at state action,91 and that a criminal defendant's
peremptory challenge is an exercise of state action. 92 Thus,
under the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, the Fifth Amendment must
87. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439.
88. [d.; see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 86.
89. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1439.
90. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89.
91. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440. See also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S.
Ct. 2077 (1991).
92. Although the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge is state action, the opposite conclusion has been reached by other
tribunals. The Supreme Court of New York, in Holtzman v. Supreme Court, 526
N.Y.S.2d 892 (Sup. 1988), held that because a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptories is not compelled by the legislature or the courts, the state could not be held accountable for the manner in which the defendant exercised his challenges. [d. at 898. However,
this decision has since been overruled by People v. Kern, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647 (1990).
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prohibit a criminal defendant's exercise of a discriminatory peremptory challenge. 93
The Ninth Circuit followed the reasoning of the United
States Supreme Court in the recent decision of Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete CO.94 In Edmonson, the Supreme Court articulated the following three-prong test to determine whether a
litigant's conduct constitutes state action: 1) the extent to which
the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits; 2)
whether the actor is performing a traditional governmental function; and 3) whether the injury caused is aggravated by the incidents of government authority.9~ Applying these criteria to the
facts of Edmonson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant in
a civil action was a state actor.98
In De Gross, the Ninth Circuit stated that the Edmonson
Court's reasoning pertained equally to a situation involving a
criminal defendant rather than a civil litigant. 97 Applying the
93. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440.
94. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991). Thaddeus Donald Edmonson, a black man, sued defendant, Leesville Concrete Company, for negligence. [d. at 2079. Leesville Concrete Company exercised two of its three peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons. [d.
Citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), plaintiff Edmonson urged the court to
require Leesville Concrete Co. to set forth a race-neutral justification for its challenge.
The district court denied Edmonson's request, stating that Batson did not apply to civil
cases. On appeal the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling. The Fifth Circuit
held that defendants become state actors when they exercise peremptory challenges, and
that limiting Batson to criminal cases "would betray Batson's fundamental principle
[that) the state's use, toleration, and approval of peremptory challenges based on race
violates the Equal Protection Clause." Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d
1308, 13i4 (5th Cir. 1989). On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to
trial. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990). The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals.
95. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
96. [d. at 2083-87. With respect to the first inquiry of the Edmonson test, the Court
noted that a private party could not exercise its peremptory challenges without the
overt, significant assistance of the court. The Supreme Court further stated that the
assistance of the judge, in enforcing the discriminatory challenge, has not only made the
court a party to the biased act, but has placed its power, property and prestige behind
the discrimination. Addressing the second prong of the test, the Court held that a traditional function of government was evident. The Court explained that the peremptory
challenge is used in selecting an "entity that is a quintessential governmental body, having no attributes of a private actor." [d.
Finally, the Court held that racial discrimination in the official forum of the courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted there, thus
compounding the injury due to the incidents of government authority.
97. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1440.
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first of the criteria set forth in Edmonson to the facts of De
Gross, the Ninth Circuit held that a criminal defendant wholly
relies on governmental assistance and benefits when exercising
peremptory challenges. 98 The court declared:
[w]ithout the overt, significant participation of
the government, the . . . entire jury system, including peremptories, could not exist or operate.
The government sets up the panel selection procedures. Peremptory challenges are not self-executing. A party seeking to exercise discriminatory
peremptory challenges must necessarily rely upon
the court to call citizens to serve as jurors, to begin the voir dire in a judicial proceeding, and to
excuse challenged venirepersons. We conclude, as
the Supreme Court did, that a party could not exercise its peremptories without significant government assistance. ee
The second prong of the Edmonson test focuses on whether
the peremptory challenge involves the performance of a traditional governmental function. The Ninth Circuit maintains that
a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge does
involve a customary governmental function. loo The court acknowledged that a jury is a governmental body whose purpose is
to carry out governmental functions. lol Jury selection and voir
dire proceedings are similarly exercises of governmental authority: although the prosecution and defendant retain a degree of
control over the process, the court maintains constant control
and supervision. l02 Citing Edmonson,103 the court observed that
"[t]he fact that the government delegates some portion of this
power to private litigants does not change the governmental
character of the power exercised. "104
Finally, applying the third prong of the Edmonson test, the
Ninth Circuit noted that since the discriminatory peremptory
challenge was exercised in the public federal courthouse, the in98. [d.
99. [d.
100. [d. at 1441.
101. [d.
102. [d.

103. 111 S. Ct. at 2086.
104. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1441.
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jury suffered by the challenged venireperson is aggravated. 1011
The occurrence of the discriminatory incident within the confines of a federal courthouse effectively intimates that the trial
judge has "abdicat[ed] his duty not to discriminate."106
The Ninth Circuit recognized no meaningful distinction between a criminal or a civil case, and held that a criminal defendant exercising peremptory challenges is a state actor. 107 Because
the Fifth Amendment's equal protection principles regulate
state action, the court reasoned that a criminal defendant's exercise of discriminatory peremptory challenges must be prohibited
since the defendant is acting under authority of the state. lOS
D.

PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE EXE~CISED WITH DISCRIMINATORY
INTENT
-

1.

The Prosecution's Challenge of Tellez

De Gross established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination against the government for striking Tellez,109 using
the test articulated in Batson v. Kentucky.1l0 The prosecution
explained that it wanted to "achieve a m~re representative community of men and women on the jury."lll The district court
accepted the government's justification as being based on neutral grounds. ll2 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district
court, stating that this explanation automatically established a
prima facie case of gender discrimination. u3 Under Batson, the
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1441-42. This conclusion is supported by the United States Supreme
Court decision in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In that case, the Court
held that a person acts under color of state law only when he is exercising power possessed solely by virtue of state authority. Id. at 317-18. Thus, the Court found that an
attorney, although an officer of the court, is not a state actor for purposes of representing
a client since that is essentially a private function. Id. at 319.
108. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1442.
109. Id.
110. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
111. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1436.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1443. The court "sympathize[d] with the prosecutor's predicament in
[that] case. Faced with a female defendant who was systematically excluding males from
the jury, the prosecutor made an understandable effort tQ balance the gender composition of the jury. However ... we cannot find that thll prosecutor's admission constituted
a neutral explanation." Id. at 1443 n.14.
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prosecution's challenge of Tellez violates De Gross' Fifth
Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. ll4 Hence, the
district court improperly struck Tellez from the jury.m
2.

De Gross' Challenge of Tiffany

Under the Batson Court's analysis, the government similarly established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination
against De Gross.us The burden then shifted to De Gross to justify her challenge with a gender-neutral explanation. u7 Since De
Gross failed to provide an explanation for her challenge, the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court was correct in disallowing her challenge and permitting Tiffany to serve on the
jury.l16

E.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

Judge Reinhardt concurred with the Ninth Circuit's ultimate holding in De Gross that the conviction be reversed.1l9 The
concurring opinion differs strongly, however, with the majority's
conclusion that the criminal defendant is a state actor.
The majority identified the defendant as a state actor because he or she invokes the authority of the state when exercising the governmental function of peremptory challenges. 12o The
concurrence contends that a criminal defendant, "the quintessential adversar[y] of the state," cannot be characterized as a
state actor.121 The concurrence proposes that the Edmonson test
is inapplicable to a situation involving a criminal defendant,
114. [d. at 1443. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85-87, holding that the equal protection
clause guarantees a defendant the right to be tried by a jury selected in a non-discriminatory manner. The Batson Court also noted that intentional discrimination in jury selection proceedings violates the defendant's right to' equal protection of the laws. [d.
115. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1433.
116. [d. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text for further discussion.
117. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1442.
118. [d.
119. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
The concurrence asserts that because De Gross' peremptory challenge to Tiffany did
not involve state action, the district court should not have permitted the government to
assert a Batson objection. Thus, the fact that Tiffany was empaneled despite De Gross'
peremptory challenge is sufficient to require reversal of De Gross' conviction. [d. at 1447.
120. [d. at 1440.
121. [d. at 1443.
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asserting:
[it] cannot be disputed that a criminal defendant's relationship to the state is fundamentally
different from that of a private litigant in a civil
case .... [I]n the ordinary context of civillitigation in which the government is not a party, an
adversarial relationship does not exist between
the government and a private litigant. By contrast, a criminal defendant has perhaps the most
adversarial relationship possible with the state.122

The concurrence further asserts that a prosecutor adopts
the mission of the state in attempting to convict the criminal
defendant. 123 Judge Reinhardt concludes that because the criminal defendant's sole objective is to thwart the prosecutor's efforts at trial, this presents an impossible conflict, dispositive of
the state action question. 124
The concurrence states that since criminal defendants cannot be characterized as state actors, their actions cannot violate
the Constitution. 12 1\ Therefore, the government is not entitled to
assert a Batson objection to a discriminatory peremptory
challenge. 126
V.

CRITIQUE

United States v. De Gross raised the issue of whether a
criminal defendant's exercise of a gender-based discriminatory
peremptory challenge, as well as the prosecution's exercise of the
same, violates the Constitution's equal protection principles. 127
The Ninth Circuit wisely extended the constitutional protection
122. Id. at 1444-45.
123. Id. at 1445.
124. Id. at 1446. The concurrence likens the majority's reasoning to a stanza from a
play by "those well-respected commentators on the absurdities found in our legal system," Gilbert and Sullivan:
A paradox, A paradox,
·.A most ingenious paradox!
How quaint the ways of paradox!
At common sense she gaily mocks!
Id. at 1447.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
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afforded to racially discriminatory peremptory challenges by
Swain and Batson to gender-based peremptory challenges as
well. us Nevertheless, the court's conclusion that a prosecutor
and a criminal defendant are equally restrained by the Constitution is troubling.
A.

CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE SUBJECT TO
EQUAL PROTECTION RESTRAINTS

It is well settled that the Constitution limits only state action. 129 Thus, a criminal defendant will only be subject to equal
protection restraints if he or she is considered a state actor. The
eleven-member panel of the Ninth Circuit was sharply divided
on the issue of whether or not De Gross' exercise of a peremptory challenge as a criminal defendant constituted state
action. ISO

The concurring opinion reasoned that a criminal defendant
cannot be deemed a state actor, since the defendant is wholly at
odds with the governmental system. lSI Indeed, it does seem
counterintuitive to suggest that a criminal defendant acts under
the state's authority when exercising peremptory challenges,
considering the state is contemporaneously using that same
power to incarcerate or possibly even execute that defendant.
The notions of equality and fairness inherent in due process and
equal protection principles would seem to demand that a criminal defendant must be given every opportunity to utilize the peremptory challenge system without being subject to the constitutional restraints imposed on the state. IS2
128. [d. at 1439.
129. The United States Constitution, with the notable exception of the thirteenth
amendment, limits only state action. The thirteenth amendment, ratified December 6,
1865, provides that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall exist within the
United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
This individual amendment, passed to facilitate the reconstruction of the southern
states, applies to private conduct as well as state action.
130. The panel split 6-5.
131. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1443.
132. The logic of considering a criminal defendant a state actor can be summarized
as follows: The state develops a formalized suspicion that the defendant is involved in
criminal activity. The defendant is summoned into court where she will be given the
opportunity to demonstrate her innocence. Although the defendant must be deemed innocent until the state meets its burden of evidentiary proof, the defendant will be considered a state actor and limited by the Constitution's equal protection principles, effec-
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The concurrence additionally finds fault with the majority's
application of the Edmonson analysis to the instant facts. 133 The
majority stressed the significance of the peremptory challenge
taking place in a governmental setting, noting that "the injury
caused by discriminatory peremptories is exacerbated by the
fact that the government allows it to occur in the courthouse-a
traditional symbol of government authority."134 Judge Reinhardt, author of the concurrence, insists that this part of the
court's analysis must be confined to civil proceedings because
only in civil proceedings are the government's and private litigants' interests harmonious with regard to voir dire.13II Conversely, it is clear that in criminal actions the prosecutor's and
defendant's interests are in direct conflict at every stage, including jury selection. Therefore, despite the fact that both civil and
criminal proceedings take place within government buildings, it
"cannot be disputed that a criminal defendant's relationship to
the state is fundamentally different from that of a private litigant."136 The majority seems to have ignored this inevitable conflict in finding state action. ls7
tively undermining her ability to use whatever means to prevail at trial.
133. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1443-44. See supra notes 95-108 for the Edmonson inquiries and their application to De Gross.
134. [d. at 1441 (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087).
135. [d. at 1444.
136. [d. at 1444-45. Judge Reinhardt further noted:
It is hard to imagine a more palpable example of the exercise
of state power than a criminal prosecution. But, that state
power is wielded by the prosecutor against the criminal defendant-not by the defendant on his own behalf. . . . Far
from wielding state power, a criminal defendant attempts to
thwart that power at every stage of the proceedings.
[d. at 1445.
137. In Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 319-21 (1981), the Court found that a
public defender could not be considered a state actor because their actions could not be
"attributable to the government." A public defender's duty is to oppose'the state's mission in criminal trials: to enter "not guilty" pleas, move to suppress state's evidence,
object to evidence at trial, cross-examine state's witnesses, and to altogether oppose the
interests of the state.
By this same rationale, a criminal defendant should not be characterized as a state
actor. Certainly the defendant's position is even farther removed from the interests of
the state than is the public defender's. The criminal defendant does not "assume an
obligation to the mission of the state," and under no circumstances can he or she fairly
be said to be acting on behalf of the state. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1446. In fact, Judge
Reinhardt submits that the only distinction between a criminal defendant and his counsel is that the public defender acts under a constitutional obligation rather than a sense
of self-preservation. [d. at 1447 n.5.
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Although logic seems to suggest that a criminal defendant
cannot be characterized as a state actor, the majority of courts
have held that because the court must actively enforce a criminal defendant's peremptory challenge, the defendant's actions
do rise to the level of state action. 138 Because a criminal defendant faces possible incarceration at the hands of the state does
not necessarily mean that he or she may not occupy the role of
state actor for the limited purpose of exercising peremptory
challenges. Support for this proposition can be found in the
United States Supreme Court decision of Georgia v.
McCollum. ls9
In McCollum the Court addressed the question of whether
equal protection principles prohibit a criminal defendant from
engaging in purposeful racial discrimination in the exercise of
peremptory challenges. 140 The Court held that the Constitution
does proscribe the exercise of racially-based discriminatory peremptory challenges by criminal defendants as well as civil defendants. Hl In so holding the Court provided a basis for reconciling Edmonson iJ. Leesville Concrete with the Ninth Circuit's
decision in De Gross, thereby abandoning the distinction between civil and criminal litigants in the exercise of peremptory
challenges. 142
In its decision to apply the rationale of Edmonson to the
facts of McCollum, the court confronted the issue of whether a
138. See United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1433 (1992); Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 79 (1986); Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
139. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992). In McCollum, respondents were charged with assaulting
two African-Americans. Id. at 2351. Before jury selection began, the prosecution moved
to prohibit respondents from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory challenges.
Id. The state theorized that the victim's race was a factor in the alleged beating. Id.
Relying on Batson u. Kentucky, the state sought an order mandating that respondents
provide a racially neutral justification for the peremptory challenges if the prosecution
established a .prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. Id. at 2351-52.
The trial judge denied the motion, id., and the state supreme court affirmed, distinguishing Edmonson u. Leesuille Concrete because Edmonson involved private civil litigants, not criminal defendants. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688, 689 (1991).
The United States Supreme Court overruled the state supreme court decision, holding that criminal defendants are subject to equal protection restraints as well as civil
litigants. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348. See infra notes 139-47 discussing the McCollum
decision.
140. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2348.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for the purposes of equal protection principles. 143 Employing the three-prong test of Edmonson,144 the
Court found that a criminal defendant was a state actor when
exercising peremptory challenges. 141i
The McCollum Court provided a thoughtful insight on the
issue which disturbed the concurring judges in De Gross:
whether a criminal defendant, motivated by a private desire to
protect his interest against the state, can be considered a state
actor as well. 146 The Court noted:
[T]he fact that a defendant exercises a peremptory challenge to further his interest in acquittal
does not conflict with a finding of state action.
Whenever a private actor's conduct is deemed
'fairly attributable' to the government, it is likely
that private motives will have animated the actor's decision. Indeed, ... the private party's motive underlying the exercise of a peremptory challenge may be to protect a private interest. 147

This logic suggests that the "state" which the criminal defendant is at odds with is distinguishable from the "state" from
which he derives his authority when exercising peremptory challenges. As the majority in De Gross explained, if there were no
distinction between the state as administrator of the justice system and the prosecution acting as agent of the state, there would
always be a potential conflict in criminal trials. H8 The court further maintained that a criminal defendant's interests are diametrically opposed to those of only the prosecutor, not to those
of the government. H9
The majority opinion in De Gross was consistent with the
established case law. Accordingly, the court was justified in concluding that De Gross invoked the authority of the state when
exercising her peremptory challenges, and thus subjected herself
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

[d. at 2359.
See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358.
[d.
[d.
De Gross, 960 F.2d at 1441.
[d.
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to the restraints of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
principles.
Once the state action issue is established, the Ninth Circuit's decision to restrict discriminatory practice in jury selection by both the defense as well as the prosecution is sound.
B.

GENDER-BASED DISCRIMINATORY PEREMPTORY
PROHIBITED BY EQUAL PROTECTION PRINCIPLES

CHALLENGES

The De Gross court held that the Constitution prohibits intentional discrimination on the basis of gender as well as race.
The :Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Fifth Amendment's equal
protection principles must restrain state actors from discriminating on the basis of gender because the same harm results as
would if the discrimination were based on the venireperson's
race. 1llO
While the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that equal protection
principles will not abide gender-based discrimination is sound,
the court was somewhat conclusory in analogizing sexual discrimination to racial discrimination. Racial and gender classifications have historically been afforded disparate treatment.lIIl
However, there are undeniable similarities between racial and
gender classifications that would seem to warrant similar treatment for purposes of the peremptory challenge: both groups
have historically endured discrimination due to membership in
an identifiable group; race and gender are immutable characteristics which cannot be altered; and minority members and females have traditionally been politically powerless. 11l2
150. See supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text for discussion of gender-based
discrimination and the resulting harm.
151. Joe, supra note 86, at 1327. Historically, gender groups have been categorized
as quasi-suspect classes, requiring an intermediate scrutiny standard of review. [d. See
also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (holding that
gender classifications standard of review is satisfied only where an important governmental purpose is being furthered).
Alternatively, racial classifications have traditionally been categorized as suspect
classes demanding a strict level of scrutiny. See Russell w. Galloway, Jr., Basic Equal
Protection Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 121, 141-42 (1989) (maintaining that racial
classifications violate equal protection principles unless they are necessary to further a
compelling state interest).
152. Joe, supra note 86, at 1327. C{. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473
U.S. 432 (1985); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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At an intuitive level the extensions of the Batson prohibition against racially discriminatory peremptory challenges to
gender-based challenges seems logical. However, any simple
analogy between gender and racial classifications is ineffective
and conclusory.l&3 Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit wisely extended equal protection to gender-based peremptory challenges.
VI. CONCLUSION

United States v. De Grossl1S 4 establishes that a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges constitutes state action for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's equal protection
principles. Hence, the challenges cannot be exercised in a discriminatory manner so as to offend the Constitution. While the
logic of such a proposition may offend traditional notions of
equality, the conclusion is probably sound as it is supported by
the majority of precedent.
Additionally, De Gross prudently extends the established
equal protection rights afforded to racial discrimination to gender-based peremptory challenges. De Gross represents an important step forward in preserving the constitutional rights of potential jurors, and should serve as a beacon for other circuit
courts faced with a similar situation.

Eric K. Ferraro·

These cases held, respectively, that mentally retarded persons and elderly persons are
not quasi-suspect classes because they do not satisfy the criterion of membership in an
identifiable group, immutable characteristics, and political powerlessness, inter alia.
153. See, e.g., Trina Grillo & Stephanie M. Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of
Race: The Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (or Other Isms), 1991 DUKE L. J. 397, 404, asserting that:
[tlo analogize gender to race, one must assume that each is a
distinct category . . . [howeverI, this division is not possible.
Whenever it is attempted, the experience of women of color,
who are at the intersection of these categories and cannot divide themselves' to compare their own experiences, is rendered
invisible. Analogizing sex discrimination to race discrimination
makes it seem that all the women are white and all the men
are African-American.
154. United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992).
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